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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY F. LINDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH SOUTHERN OIL COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8045 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. They are stipu-
lated (2 Stipulations Tr. 5, 10). The statement 
contained 1n appellant's brief is substantially cor-
rect. 
ARGUMENT 
The ultimate question for determination is: Did 
respondent become the owner of the dividends im-
mediately when they were declared? If respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
was the owner of the 800 shares of stock, even though 
she had not had them transferred to her name on the 
books of the company, and if the ownership of the 
shares carried with it the ownership of the dividends 
declared thereon, then appellant was not justified in 
paying them to Leary. 
(a) RESPONDENT OWNED THE 800 SHARES 
WHEN THE DIVIDENDS WERE DECLARED. 
It was stipulated and the Findings recite: 
"* * * That on or about the lOth day of 
June, 19 3 1, * * * Margaret T. Donovan was, 
and for a long time prior thereto had been, re-
siding with the plaintiff in the city of Pitts-
burgh, and that on or about said date said 
Margaret ·T. Donovan had in her possession 
certain certificates of stock in several oil and 
mining companies, among which certificates 
were certificates numbered 2011 to 2018 ag-
gregating 800 shares of stock issued by the de-
fendant company in the name of James H. Dal-
ziel and endorsed by him. * * * That on or 
about the lOth day of June, 1931, ***Mar-
garet T. Donovan made actual delivery of all 
of said stock certificates to respondent with the 
remark in substance and effect: 'Mary, I want 
you to have these certificates. They are yours. 
I understand that they are of no value now, 
but they may be of value to you some day.' 
That the plaintiff accepted said certificates and 
kept them with other of her personal papers 
until on or about the 15th day of June, 1951/' 
* * * (Tr. 6-7.) 
The dividends, (including the payment of the 
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interest-bearing notes), were declared as follows: 
· Dec. 18, 1948-$2.50 per share (interest-bear-
ing notes). 
Dec. 18, 1948-$1.00 per share. 
Dec. 10, 1949-$0.25 per share. 
Sept. 15, 1950-$0.25 per share. 
A total of $4.00 per share on 800 shares-
$3,200.00. (Tr. 6.) 
It was further stipulated and found that the 
said shares of stock were at all times in the exclusive 
possession of respondent under claim of ownership by 
her from about the lOth day of June, 1931, until 
they were delivered to the brokerage firm of Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner ~ Beane, at their St. Peters-
burg, Florida, office on or about the 15th day of 
June, 1951, and on or about the 27th day of 
June, 19 51, said stock certificates were sold by said 
brokerage firm and respondent received the full pro-
ceeds of the sale thereof, less the brokerage commission. 
After the sale, said certificates were pre sen ted to the 
appellant by the purchasers thereof and were trans-
ferred to said purchasers on the books and records 
of the appellant company and new certificates issued 
in lieu thereof. ( T r. 7. ) 
From Mrs. Do.novan' s possession of the endorsed 
certificates a presumption of ownership attached, and 
a determination of the question of ownership must be 
according to the presumption unless controverted by 
competent evidence. United States Supply Company 
v. Gillespie (Okla.), 16 6 Pacific. 13 9; Park v. Grady 
(Mont.), 204 Pac. 382; Tracy v. Juanto (Ore.), 
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205 Pac. 822; Hogg v. Eckhardt (111.), 175 N. E. 
382; Williams v. Gray (Mont.), 203 Pac. 524; Cof~ 
fin v. Hyde (Idaho), 205 Pac. 736; Feehan v. Ken~ 
drick (Idaho), 179 Pac. 507; an~ Tobias v. Mining 
Company (Idaho), 17 Pac. (2d) 338. 
Mrs. Donovan accompanied the actual deliv~ 
ery of the certificates to respondent with the words: 
"Mary, I want you to have these certificates. They 
are yours. I understand that they are of no value 
now, but they may be of value to you some day." 
(Tr. 7.) 
Mrs. Donovan had been living with her daugh~ 
ter for some time previous to this transaction, and 
whether there was some consideration (such as serv~ 
ices rendered) for the delivery of the stock does not 
appear. However, the transaction constituted a valid 
gift. 
In Vandor v. Roach (Cal.), 15 Pac. 354, the 
words, ''These bonds are for you,'' were held suf ~ 
ficient evidence of a gift. Said the court: 
Hit is argued that what was done did not 
show sufficient intention of giving. The Coun-
sel says that 'the operative words of a gift are: 
"I give" or ''I have given" '; and that these 
vvords are wanting. But we do not think that 
any formula or set phrase is necessary. It is 
sufficient if there was delivery, and any words 
importing an intention to give. The only evi~ 
dence on the subject was that of the physician, 
who testified that the dying man took a pack-
age from under his pillow, and handed it to the 
plaintiff, saying: 'These bonds are for you. t 
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The witness did not pretend to give the precise 
words uttered, but stated that this was the sub-
stance of what was said. This, we think, was 
sufficient manifestation of intention to give." 
In Coffin v. Hyde, supra, the court uses this lan-
guage: 
''It has been held that the test of an effec-
tual gift is that the transfer was such that, in 
conjunction with the donative intention, it 
completely stripped the donor of his dominion 
of the thing given (Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. 
Law, 3 73, 26 Atl. 803), and, in the absence of 
explanatory or contradictory evidence, the pos-
session by the donee of an instrument transfer-
ring the title to the property to him is suffi-
cient to raise the intent that it should take ef-
fect according to its terms. It is apparent, 
therefore, in this case, that the decedent intend-
ed to confer on respondent ownership of the 
property here involved, that he proceeded to 
do so by executing and delivering to respondent 
a bill of sale to the property, and that the gift 
was therefore complete. As is said in Sharpe v. 
Sh~arpe, supra: 
'' 'Gifts causa mortis are older than the 
republic; and, if they be satisfactorily proven, 
it is the duty of the court to give effect to 
th ' '' em. 
From her possession of the certificates it is pre-
sumed that respondent was a bona fide holder. As 
stated in Feehan v. Ken,drick, supra: 
''Possessors of certificates of stock are, 
prima facie, presumed to be bona fide holders, 
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and it was incumbent upon appellant to al-
lege that respondent was not a holder, in good 
faith, without notice of the fraud charged." 
And in Tobias v. Mining Company, supra, it is 
said: 
"It is clear from C. S. 4730, that the 
shares of stock in question were subject to be 
transferred by indorsement of the certificates by 
the signature of the proprietor and delivery 
thereof. The certificates in question were in-
dorsed by the signature of McConnell, the pro-
prietor, properly witnessed, in favor of respon-
dent, her name being written in the indorse-
ments, and the same were in her possession, 
which at least raised a presumption of deliv-
ery and rightful possession and that the instru-
ments of transfer should take effect according 
to their terms.'' 
Our statute, section 16-3-1, provides: 
''Exclusive manner of transfer.-Title to 
a certificate and to the shares represented there-
by can be transferred only: 
" ( 1) By delivery of the certificate in-
dorsed either in blank or to a specified person 
by the person appearing by the certificate to 
be the owner of the shares represented thereby. 
(Italics ours) . 
* * * * 
''The provisions of this section shall be 
applicable although the charter or articles of 
incorporation or code of regulations or by-laws 
of the corporation issuing the certificate and 
the certificate itself provide that the shares rep-
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resented thereby shall be transferrable only on 
the books of the corporation or shall be regis-
tered by a registrar or transferred by a trans-
fer agent.'' 
This court has held that there is no longer any 
question as to the validity of transfer by mere en-
dorsement and delivery of the certificate even before 
the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 
Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 161 Pac. 448. 
Appellant is in no better position to question 
respondent's title to the shares than if she, at any 
time, after receiving them, had presented the same to 
the appellant for transfer. As a matter of fact, ap-
pellant did recognize her title by transferring the 
shares upon presentation thereof by the purchasers. 
Title to the shares became vested in plaintiff by one 
of the exclusive methods prescribed by the statute, 
and the argument of counsel that, according to the 
by-laws of appellant: 
''transfers of stock shall be made on the books 
of the corporation only by the person named 
in the certificate or by an attorney lawfully 
consituted in writing, and upon surrender and 
cancellation of the certificate therefor." (See 
appellant's Brief, pp. 5 and 9). 
has no weight as affecting respondent's title to the 
stock, in face of the statute. 
In First National Bank v. Stribling (Okla.) 86 
Pac. 512, it is held that shares of stock in a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the territory of 
Oklahoma are personal property, and may be trans-
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ferred by indorsement and delivery of the certificate; 
and where such shares of stock, when issued, pro-
vide that they are transferable on the books of the 
corporation only on surrender of the certificate, such 
provision is binding upon the corporation, and it can-
not reissue such stock without the surrender of the 
original certificate to any person other than the per-
son in whose name they stand on the books of the 
company, and thereby escape liability to a person 
who holds su.:h stock by assignment and delivery of 
the same. Such reissued stock is fraudulent and void 
as against the rights of the bona fide holder of the 
original. 
Mrs. Donovan made delivery to respondent un-
der such circumstances as to constitute a gift, and the 
transfer was made in accordance with the statute and 
in accordance with the authorities that an indorsed 
certificate passes title by delivery. 
Sees. 16-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, provides: 
"The delivery of a certificate to transfer 
title in accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tion 16-3-1 is effectual, except as provided in 
Section 16-3-7, though made by one having no 
right of possession and having no authority 
from the owner of the certificate or from the 
person purporting to transfer the title.n (Ital-
ics ours.) 
· 1 herefore, even if Mrs. Donovan had no right 
of possession, her delivery of the certificates was suf-
ficient to transfer the title to respondent, for it was . 
not within the exceptions specified in Sec. 16-3-7. 
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Appellant at all times knew, of course, that said 
certificates were outstanding, and when Leary 
claimed ownership, appellant was so apprehensive 
that the certificates might, at any time, be presented 
by someone who had succeeded to Dalziel's title that 
it required from Leary a bond indemnifying appel-
lant against all loss, damage or expense which it 
might suffer or sustain in the event these certificates 
should be presented; and Leary furnished such a bond. 
(Tr. 10.) 
In First N a tiona! Bank v. Stribling (Okla.) 8 6 
Pac. 516, it is said: 
"It is true that the holder could not assert, 
as against the corporation, any right under it 
except the right to have the transfer noted on 
the books of the corporation until it was so 
noted. But the holder is the only person who 
can demand such notation of transfer, and this 
he may do upon surrender of the certificate, and 
is not limited in time to do so. Any attempt 
on the part of the transferrer, in this case Strib-
ling, to secure a transfer of the stock on the 
books of the company in any name but that of 
the transferee, is an attempted fraud, if success-
ful is a fraud, and the corporation acting in 
violation of its agreement not to transfer, ex-
cept on surrender of the certificate, must be 
held to be a party to it. The bond required 
and taken by the company before it would con-
sent to a reissue of the stock in no way re-
lieves it from the consequences of its fraudu-
lent act; but is, on the other. hand, a confes-
sion that it was violating its obligation not to 
transfer its stock except on surrender of the cer-
tificate. * * *'' 
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It further appears from the stipulated facts that 
after appellant had recognized the validity of the old 
certificates, and the validity of the claim of owner-
ship by the purchasers from respondent, and had is-
sued to said purchasers new certificates, appellant 
made demand upon Leary for the return of the new 
certificates which had been issued to him. Upon his 
refusal to make return thereof, appellant went into the 
market and bought 800 shares for cancelation so as 
to remedy an over-issue, and then sued the bond com-
pany for reimbursement, and the .bond company re-
sponded by the payment to appellant of $11,240.00. 
(Tr. 11.) Appellant then issued to the surety com-
pany a partial release, but expressly provided that it 
would not be released or discharged from liability on 
any claim which might thereafter be made on account 
of the payment of the dividends to Leary after the 
new certificates had been issued to him, but which 
had been declared while respondent was the owner and 
in possssion of the original certificates. (Tr. 11.) 
(b) RIGHT TO DIVIDEND FOLLOWED OWNER-
SHIP OF STOCK. 
In view of the fact that respondent owned the 
certificates when the dividends were declared; that ap-
pellant recognized her ownership by recognizing the 
validity of her sale of the certificates, why should it 
not recognize her claim to the dividends? Counsel 
argues that the company is protected by paying the 
dividends to stockholders of record, but these divi-
dends were not declared on the stock which was is-
sued to Leary. They were declared on the particu-
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lar certificates in the possession of, and owned by, re-
spondent. Immediately when these dividends were. 
declared, respondent, as owner of the certificates, be-
came vested with title to the dividends. 
In Clarke v. Campbell, 23 Utah 569, 65 Pac. 
496, defendant deposited in escrow certain shares of 
stock to be delivered to Clarke upon payment of 
$75,000.00. While said shares were in escrow, cer-
tain dividends amounting to $19,000.00 were de-
clared thereon. Clarke paid for the stock as agreed, 
and then claimed the dividends. The court held: 
"Dividends declared on corporation stock 
belong to the persons owning the stock at the 
time the dividends were declared." 
In Western Securities Co. v. Mining Company, 
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664, the court declares: 
''The general rule, so far as we know, in 
the absence of a statute to the contrary, which 
is enforced by the courts, is that the dividends 
belong to the stockholder who owns the stock 
at the time the dividend is declared, and, al-
though he parts with his stock after the divi-
dend is declared and before it is paid, he nev-
ertheless is entitled thereto unless he has as-
signed or disposed of the dividend with the 
stock or independently thereof. The mere sale 
and transfer of the certificates of stock after a 
dividend is declared does not carry with it the 
dividend. One of the cases to which frequent 
references is made in the decisions is the case 
of Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 20 N. E. 
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350, 8 Am. St. Rep. 771. In the course of the 
opinion it is said: 
·' 'The declaration of the dividend is in 
legal contemplation a separation of the amount 
thereof from the assets of the corporation, 
which holds such amount thereafter as the 
trustee of the stockholder at the time of the 
declaration of the dividend. In the absence, 
therefore, of any provision in a contract of sale 
and purchase of stock, outside of and not sub-
ject to the rules of the Stock Exchange, the 
law declares that such a contract gives the divi-
dends to the owner of the shares when the divi-
dends were declared.' " 
In First National Bank v. Glenn, 36 Fed. Sup. 
5 52, it is held: 
~·The declaration of a dividend by a cor-
poration creates between the corporation and 
the stockholder a 'debtor and creditor relation-
ship' instanter regardless of the fact that pay-
ment is not to be made until a later date." 
In Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. II, pages 65-
66, it is said: 
"In preceding sections it is pointed out 
that a stockholder is one who owns stock in a 
corporation, and that a certificate of stock is 
not the stock itself, but merely the written evi-
dence of the stockholder's rights as such. It 
is a necessary conclusion therefrom that issu-
ance of a certificate of stock is not necessary 
to make one a stockholde-r * * * and although 
he may have no certificate, he is entitled 
to all the rights and is subject to all the 
liabilities of a stockholde-r.'' 
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In support of this statement are cited cases 
from 3 2 states. 
Counsel refers to the fact that respondent aban-
doned her claim to dividends declared and paid to Hal-
linan on the 200 shares standing in his name. Of 
course, a corporation is protected in the payment of 
dividends to those who are stockholders of record at the 
time the dividend is declared if it has no knowledge 
of any endorsement or transfer of the shares, and if 
payment had been made to Dalziel without notice to 
the company of his indorsement of the stock and 
its possession by the respondent, respondent's remedy 
would have been against Dalziel; but no payment was 
made of respondent's money to Dalziel as had been 
done in the case of Hallinan. Why should appel-
lant be permitted to escape liability to respondent for 
wrongfully giving her money away when it pro-
tected itself by bond against its wrongful act, and 
when it knew that it would be obligated to answer 
to the owner of the original certificates if, as was 
the case, Leary's claim that he was the owner and that 
the certificates were lost, was false? 
The case of Mahoning Railroad Co. v. Robbins, 
et al., 35 Ohio State Rep. 483, upon which counsel 
relies, is, so far as the question of dividends is con-
cerned, directly at variance with the decisions of this 
and other courts which hold that the right to clivi-
. dends follows the ownership of the stock. 
(c) SUMMARY. 
1. Mrs. Donovan was prima facie the owner 
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of the shares in June, 19 31 ; the certificates being 
endorsed by Dalziel and in her possession. 
2. Respondent be-came owner by gift and de-
livery from her mother, Mrs. Donovan. 
3. Respondent had sole possession of and 
owned the certificates from June, 1931 until June, 
1951. 
4. The dividends sued for were declared, while 
respondent owned the shares, and when declared, in-
stanter became the property of respondent. 
5. Appellant could not relieve itself of liabil-
ity from respondent by paying her money to Leary 
simply because he claimed to be owner of the shares, 
when his claim was without foundation. 
6. The dividends were declared on respondent's 
shares, not on the shares which were erroneous! y is-
sued to Leary. 
7. The assignment to Leary by Mrs. Dalziel 
~ave him no right to the shares or the dividends, be-
cause Mrs. Dalziel had no interest therein which could 
be transferred. 
8. Under Utah Statute, no provision of ap-
pellant's by-laws requiring shares to be transferred 
on the books of the company could affect or impair 
respondent's title to the shares and her right to the 
dividends. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JESSE R. s. BUDGE, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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